I want to align myself with the concerns raised by @Joel, @j0sh, and @wiser. I think they’ve collectively identified the core issues with this proposal.
The most fundamental point is that the proposal’s stated goal has already been achieved without intervention. Inflation is already back to where it was in March 2025 and has been trending downward since October. The protocol is self-correcting exactly as designed.
The proposal claims lowering the target won’t significantly affect the actual bonding rate, but it’s unlikely to be a coincidence that bonding has historically hovered near the target rate of 50%. Lowering the target may simply pull that equilibrium down, and you end up in the same relative position but with lower participation.
Even accepting the concern about negative perception around high inflation, I’m not sure this change addresses it. If participation were to fall below 46% for an extended period, inflation would rise faster than it does today since the proposal also increases the rate of inflation adjustment.
Given all of this, I don’t think there is urgency or a logical case for changing these core parameters. If the community does want to guard against the bonding rate falling below 50% for an extended period and the hypothetical perception risk that may follow, I’d encourage revisiting the ceiling and floor proposal as the more principled path forward. I believe @awma himself argued in February 2025 that a more direct measure is to cap issuance directly and @stronk drafted a PR for that approach. It’s not clear why we’re being asked to pass the weaker, more contested lever instead.